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Abstract
A mental state is luminous if, whenever an agent is
in that state, they are in a position to know that they
are. Following Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and
Its Limits, a wave of recent work has explored whether
there are any non-trivial luminous mental states. A ver-
sion of Williamson’s anti-luminosity appeals to a safety-
theoretic principle connecting knowledge and confi-
dence: if an agent knows 𝑝, then 𝑝 is true in any nearby
scenario where she has a similar level of confidence in
p. However, the relevant notion of confidence is rela-
tively underexplored. This paper develops a precise the-
ory of confidence: an agent’s degree of confidence in 𝑝
is the objective chance they will rely on 𝑝 in practical
reasoning. This theory of confidence is then used to crit-
ically evaluate the anti-luminosity argument, leading to
the surprising conclusion that although there are strong
reasons for thinking that luminosity does not obtain,
they are quite different from those the existing litera-
ture has considered. In particular, we show that once the
notion of confidence is properly understood, the failure
of luminosity follows from the assumption that knowl-
edge requires high confidence, and does not require any
kind of safety principle as a premise.
1 ANTI-LUMINOSITY
A mental state is luminous if, whenever an agent is in that state, they are in a position to know
that they are.Much recent debate, followingWilliamson (2000), concerns the question of whether
there are any non-trivial luminous states.1
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Williamson’s discussion is rich, and has been read as offering not one anti-luminosity argu-
ment but two. The arguments share a common form: a sequence of cases is presented in which
the agent undergoes gradual change in a mental state. The assumption that the mental state is
luminous is then shown to conflict with safety principles connecting knowledge, truth, and some
doxastic state. The precise formulation of the safety principles—and the doxastic states involved—
varies between the two arguments. One involves the coarse state of ‘all-or-nothing’ belief. The
other, which will be the primary focus of this paper, connects knowledge with the ‘graded’
notion of degrees of confidence, which Williamson understands as “degrees of outright belief”
(p. 99).
Let us represent the epistemic state of a single agent using a knowledge operator𝐾.2 Consider a
candidate luminous mental state, such as feeling cold, and let 𝑝 be the proposition that the agent
feels cold. Then luminosity about feeling cold says:
(1) Luminosity. If 𝑝, then 𝐾𝑝.
For simplicity, assume that subjective coldness comes in degrees, and can be measured on a
scale from 0 to 1, where 1 is extremely cold and 0 is extremely hot. Now consider an example
where an agent starts off feeling cold and ends up feeling hot. This can be modeled with a set of
worlds {𝑤1, 𝑤0.99, … ,𝑤0}, where 𝑤𝑖 is a world where the agent’s degree of subjective coldness is
𝑖. (Note that higher subscripts indicate worlds where the agent is colder). Furthermore, assume
that there is a cutoff 𝑐 where the agent feels cold just in case her degree of subjective coldness is
greater than 𝑐.3
(2) Cutoff. 𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 iff 𝑖 > 𝑐 where 0 < 𝑐 < 1
The anti-luminosity argument requires two premises about confidence. The first is that the
agent’s degrees of confidence are continuous, so that if the agent felt slightly colder, her confidence
that she felt cold would be slightly higher. Let 𝐶𝑖(𝑝) represent the agent’s degree of confidence in
𝑝 at world 𝑖. Let 𝐶𝑖(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶𝑗(𝑝) signify that 𝐶𝑖(𝑝) and 𝐶𝑗(𝑝) are similar degrees of confidence.
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The assumption is:
(3) Continuity. 𝐶𝑖(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶𝑗(𝑝) iff |𝑖 − 𝑗| < 0.02
Finally, we turn to the safety principle connecting knowledge and confidence. Here is
Williamson on the required premise:
Suppose that at [𝑤𝑖] one knows that one feels cold. Thus one is at least reasonably
confident that one feels cold . . .Moreover, this confidence must be reliably based,
for otherwise one would still not know that one feels cold. Now at [𝑤𝑖−0.01] one is
almost equally confident that one feels cold. . . So if one does not feel cold at [𝑤𝑖−0.01],
then one’s confidence at [𝑤𝑖] that one feels cold is not reliably based, for one’s almost
equal confidence on a similar basis a millisecond later that one felt cold is mistaken.
(Williamson, 2000, p. 96)
The relevant safety principle is this: if an agent knows 𝑝 at 𝑤𝑖 and her degrees of confidence in 𝑝
are similar between 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑗 , then 𝑝 must also be true at 𝑤𝑗 . Call this principle:
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(4) Confidence Safety. If 𝐾𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 and 𝐶𝑖(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶𝑗(𝑝), then 𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑗 .
Now, Continuity implies that an agent’s confidence at𝑤𝑖 is similar to her confidence at𝑤𝑖−0.01.
So if she knows that she feels cold in 𝑤𝑖 , then she feels cold in 𝑤𝑖−0.01. This quickly leads to con-
tradiction given Luminosity.
Observation 1. Luminosity, Cutoff, Continuity, and Confidence Safety are incompatible.
By Cutoff, there is some 𝑖 such that 𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 and false at 𝑤𝑖−0.01. By Continuity, 𝐶𝑖(𝑝) ≈
𝐶𝑖−0.01(𝑝). By Confidence Safety, 𝐾𝑝 is therefore false at 𝑤𝑖 . So Luminosity fails at 𝑤𝑖 .
The primary aims of our paper are to systematically investigate this argument, and the relation
between confidence and anti-luminosity more generally. The question is far from a mere matter
of detail. The anti-luminosity debate bears on fundamental issues both within epistemology—
the internalism/externalism dispute, the nature of epistemic normativity, constraints on doxastic
planning, etc—and elsewhere in philosophy—e.g. the existence of response-dependent concepts
and the feasibility of assertibility-conditional semantic theories.5 And in turn, we believe that
confidence-theoretic considerations are crucial to the overall case for anti-luminosity; we share
the view (argued in Berker (2008) and conceded by Srinivasan, 2013) that Williamsonian argu-
ments involving all-or-nothing belief are dialectically ineffective against an important class of
proponents of luminosity, namely those who hold that, for certain mental states, there is a con-
stitutive connection between the state obtaining and being believed to obtain.6 Much therefore
turns on confidence.
The plan is as follows. We start from first principles and develop (§2) a precise theory of confi-
dence to help us find our way through the issues. FollowingWilliamson (2000), we understand an
agent’s degree of confidence in 𝑝 as the degree to which an agent relies on 𝑝 in practical reason-
ing. Departing fromWilliamson (2000), however, we offer an account of these degrees in terms of
the objective chance that the agent relies on 𝑝. In §3, we advocate a principle linking knowledge
and ideally reliable confidence: that if an agent’s degrees of confidence are ideally reliable and
her confidence in 𝑝 exceeds a threshold, then she knows 𝑝. A principle of this sort is implicitly
accepted by much of the contemporary literature; the debate thus turns, in large part, on what
an ideally reliable confidence profile looks like. We go on to offer a new account, according to
which an agent’s degrees of confidence are ideally reliable just in case they correspond to the
objective chances. We then (§4) return to the anti-luminosity argument and show that our theory
of confidence leads to two surprising conclusions. The first is that, by considering the connection
between ideally reliable confidence and knowledge, Confidence Safety can be shown to fail in a
wide range of cases. Second, however, this should not be cause for celebration by proponents of
Luminosity, since Luminosity can also be shown to fail in a wide range of cases by the principle
that knowledge implies confidence.
By the end we hope to have accomplished two goals. One is to have provided a new and philo-
sophically fruitful theory of confidence. The other is to have offered a novel anti-luminosity argu-
ment: one which does not rely on controversial and dubiously motivated safety principles like
Confidence Safety, but rests instead on an independently plausible account of confidence and its
connection to knowledge.
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2 CONFIDENCE
Confidence, as we will understand it, is a graded doxastic state, representing a certain kind of
‘strength’ or ‘degree’ of commitment to a proposition.7 We follow Williamson (2000) in viewing
confidence as closely tied to practical reasoning:
One believes 𝑝 outright when one is willing to use 𝑝 as a premise in practical reason-
ing . . . Since using 𝑝 as a premise in practical reasoning is relying on 𝑝, we can think
of one’s degree of outright belief in 𝑝 as the degree to which one relies on 𝑝[. . . ]
The degrees of confidence mentioned in the argument for [anti-luminosity] should
therefore be understood as degrees of outright belief. (Williamson, 2000, p. 98-9)
It is crucial to note that, despite some similarities between confidence and the more familiar
graded doxastic state of ‘subjective probability’ or ‘credence’, the two are importantly distinct. The
clearest way to see this is via a case adapted fromWilliamson (2000):
(5) Lottery Bag. In a number of draws, a ball is drawn from a bag. In Draw𝑖 , the bag contains 𝑖
red balls and 100 − 𝑖 black balls. In each draw, Billy knows the number of red and black balls
in the bag. Billy reasonably assigns a credence of 𝑖
100
to the proposition that the drawn ball is
red. In each case, Billy is offered the opportunity to purchase a lottery ticket which costs 1 and
which pays out $1000 if the drawn ball is black. In Draw100 he declines; in all other draws he
purchases the ticket.
Let 𝑟 be the proposition that the drawn ball is red. In Draw100, Billy knows 𝑟, his credence
in 𝑟 is 1, and his confidence in 𝑟 is also 1. However, in Draw99, Billy does not know 𝑟 and his
credence in 𝑟 is 0.99. What about his degree of confidence? Williamson suggests that, since Billy
takes the bet, it is very low, perhaps even 0: Billy hardly relies at all on 𝑟, but rather relies on the
proposition that the probability of 𝑟 is 0.99, and this explains why he purchases the ticket. More
generally:
One may assign 𝑝 a high subjective probability without believing 𝑝 outright, if the
corresponding premise in one’s practical reasoning is just that 𝑝 is highly probable
on one’s evidence, not 𝑝 itself. (Williamson 2000, p. 98)
Williamson’s description of Billy’s doxastic and epistemic position in Lottery Bag implies that
that confidence is distinct from credence. In Draw99, he diagnoses Billy’s degree of confidence in
𝑟 as very low, perhaps even 0; at the same time, Billy’s credence in 𝑟 is 0.99. Thus credence and
confidence come apart. AsWilliamson (2000) puts it, “one’s subjective probability can vary while
one’s degree of outright belief remains zero” (p. 99).
Williamson’s gloss on confidence is suggestive, and his diagnosis of Lottery Bag is plausible.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of evaluating the anti-luminosity argument, it would be desirable
to have a more systematic and developed theory of confidence at our disposal. Developing such a
theory is our aim in the rest of this section.
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2.1 A dispositional theory of confidence
We’ve said that an agent’s degree of confidence in 𝑝 is the degree to which they rely on 𝑝 in
practical reasoning. But how can reliance come in degrees? Our answer looks to dispositions: an
agent’s confidence in 𝑝 is the degree to which they are disposed to rely on 𝑝.
The idea that dispositions come in degrees has independent motivation. One reason comes
from comparative dispositional claims:
(6) Glass A is more fragile than Glass B.
A natural way to make sense of (6) is that it is true when Glass A is fragile to a higher degree
than Glass B.
We propose to adopt a version of the view found in Manley and Wasserman (2008), where the
degree of a disposition is explained in terms of the proportion of nearby worlds in which the
disposition manifests.
In particular, we work with a simplification of the Manley-Wasserman view. The degree of a
disposition is evaluated relative to some set of nearbyworlds𝑁. In general𝑁will likely be context-
sensitive; we will say more soon about how 𝑁 might naturally be chosen in the epistemic cases
withwhichwe are concerned. Next, to simplify talk of ‘proportions’ of possible worlds, we assume
an objective chance function 𝐶ℎ over the set of possible worlds. Intuitively, the proportion of 𝜙
worlds in which 𝜓 is true can be represented as the chance of 𝜓 conditional on 𝜙, or 𝐶ℎ(𝜓 ∣ 𝜙).
Then we propose:
(7) The degree to which 𝑜 is disposed to be 𝐹 is the objective chance that 𝑜 is 𝐹, conditional on𝑁.
This proposal explains (6): Glass A ismore fragile thanGlass Bwhen, in nearby possible worlds,
A has a higher objective chance of shattering than does B.8,9
This theory of degrees of disposition gives us a precise account of confidence. Let 𝑅𝑝 be the
proposition that the agent relies on 𝑝. Then we claim an agent’s degree of confidence in 𝑝 is
simply the chance that they rely on 𝑝 in nearby worlds:
(8) Dispositionalism. 𝐶(𝑝) = 𝐶ℎ(𝑅𝑝 ∣ 𝑁)
In addition to degrees of confidence, we also introduce a notion of all-or-nothing confidence. For
simplicity we assume a Lockean analysis, so that an agent is all-or-nothing confident in 𝑝 (written
𝐶𝑝) iff her degree of confidence in 𝑝 is greater than a threshold 𝑙.10
(9) Lockeanism. 𝐶𝑝 if 𝐶(𝑝) > 𝑙
We now apply Dispositionalism to Lottery Bag. In Draw100, Billy’s degree of confidence that the
drawn ball is red is the chance that he relies on it being red in nearbyworlds. In order for this value
to be 1, Billymust rely on the ball being red at every nearbyworld. In §3,we offer a substantive gloss
on nearness in the kinds of epistemic cases we are concerned with, in terms of subjective indis-
cernibility. For now, however, we help ourselves to the simplifying assumption that two worlds
are near in Lottery Bag just in case they have the same lottery structure. Since Billy is certain of
the setup of the case, this assumption seems both harmless and independently plausible.
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All of the nearby worlds to Draw100 are thus worlds in which the bag contains 100 red balls.
Now, turn to the question ofwhether Billy relies on the ball being red at nearbyworlds. To generate
a prediction here, wemake twomild assumptions: (i) all nearbyworlds preserve Billy’s knowledge
of the case and his rational betting dispositions; and (ii) Billy relies on the drawn ball being red iff
he refrains from buying the lottery ticket that wins if the drawn ball is black. By (i), Billy does not
buy the lottery ticket in any of the nearby worlds; so by (ii), he relies on the drawn ball being red
in all nearby worlds. Thus his degree of confidence is 1.
Now consider Draw99. Again, any nearby world also contains a draw from a bag with 99 red
balls and 1 black ball. By (i), Billy makes the bet in all nearby worlds. So by (ii), no nearby world
is one in which Billy relies on the drawn ball being red. Consequently, his degree of confidence
that the drawn ball is red is 0.
Lottery Bag is an example of a case where degrees of confidence come apart from the more
familiar notion of credence. For another such case, imagine the agent is holding a transparently
fair coin in her hand, and is about to flip it twice. Her credence that the coin will land heads twice
is 0.25. But shemay have a very low degree of disposition to rely in practical reasoning on the coin
landing heads twice, and hence a very low degree of confidence.
Thus, in cases like Lottery Bag, one’s degree of confidence in our sense can systematically depart
from the credence it would be rational to hold given knowledge of chance-facts. This may at first
be somewhat surprising, but it is in keeping with the existing literature on the role of confidence
in anti-luminosity arguments.11 We hope the initial surprise will be reduced once it is noticed
that confidence and credence are simply two different states, and that there is nothing incoherent
about supposing that people have both. Moreover, nothing in our account of confidence prohibits
us from adopting an entirely orthodox account of credence.
Dispositionalism is a precise and systematic theory of confidence which delivers the desired
verdicts about Billy’s degrees of confidence. What’s more, it provides a plausible reduction of con-
fidence to naturalistically unproblematic notions like dispositions and reliance. It is true that we
have said little about what it is to rely on a proposition in practical reasoning. For themost part, we
conduct our inquiry below by considering general principles about reliance which should hold on
any reasonable theory. That said, in §3.2 we show that the main assumption about reliance nec-
essary for our argument also follows from a plausible pragmatic theory of reliance.
3 CONFIDENCE SAFETY AND IDEAL RELIABILITY
The heart of existing anti-luminosity arguments is the principle we have called Confidence Safety,
which holds that knowledge requires ‘safe’ confidence. However, the principle is not simple
to assess. On the one hand, safety-theoretic constraints on knowledge have gained currency in
recent years, and perhaps Confidence Safety inherits some plausibility from the theoretical suc-
cess of this general approach. But on the other hand, the differences between Confidence Safety
and more commonly discussed safety principles are worth bearing in mind. The usual safety
constraint on knowledge concerns all-or-nothing belief, and holds that a belief must be safe in
order to constitute knowledge. Confidence Safety, by contrast, says that one’s degree of confi-
dence must be safe not just in the nearby scenarios where one’s confidence is the same degree
but also in those where it is sightly lower (or higher). It is no surprise, then, that opponents of
Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument have discerned something problematically soritical in the
principle.12
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To overcome this impasse, we offer a suggestion as to how a disciplined investigation into the
relationship between confidence and knowledge can be conducted. Start with the platitude that
an agent’s degrees of confidence can be epistemically evaluated. Just as wemight judge an agent’s
beliefs or degrees of credence to be (more or less, or outright) justified, or rational, or reliable,
so too can we do the same for degrees of confidence. Now, return to the motivation behind Con-
fidence Safety. Suppose one’s confidence that 𝑝 is high, and that there is a nearby situation in
which one’s confidence is almost the same but where 𝑝 is false. As Williamson (2000, p. 96) puts
it, “one’s confidence that one feels cold. . . is not reliably based, for one’s almost equal confidence
on a similar basis a millisecond later that one felt cold is mistaken”.
The thought, in short, is that certain degrees of confidence are too unreliable or unreliably
based to constitute knowledge. A promising direction of investigation, therefore, is to theorize
about fully or ideally reliable degrees of confidence. Let us dramatize the situation by considering
an agent whose degrees of confidence are ideally reliable, in the sense of being not at all unreliable
or unreliably based. Of course, we do not claim that any actual epistemic agents are remotely like
this; nevertheless, considering an ideal agent of this kind will clarify the issues considerably, for
such an agent’s epistemic state will be invulnerable to the criticism that they are unreliable. We
write 𝐶!(⋅), 𝐶! and 𝐾! to represent the degrees of confidence, outright confidence, and knowledge
of an ideally reliable agent.
The following principle connects ideal reliability and knowledge. If an ideally reliable agent is
(outright) confident in a proposition, and the proposition is true, then it is known:
(10) Ideal Reliability. (𝐶!𝑝 ∧ 𝑝) → 𝐾!𝑝
A few comments are in order.
First, those who hold safety-theoretic or more generally externalist accounts of knowledge will
find Ideal Reliability appealing as a general epistemic principle—in particular, those who believe
that the primary epistemic constraint on a doxastic state in order for it to constitute knowledge is
that it be safely or reliably true.13 If the primary threat to knowledge is unreliability, and we con-
sider an agent whose degrees of confidence are ideally reliable by stipulation, then such an agent
surely overcomes the threat of unreliability—and hence knows—whenever they are confident in
a true proposition.
Second, even those who reject such an account of knowledge, such as those who believe that
knowledge additionally requires some kind of internalist justification, should consent to the fol-
lowing principle:
(11) Ideal Justified Reliability. (𝐶!𝑝 ∧ 𝑝 ∧ 𝐽!𝑝) → 𝐾!𝑝
where 𝐽!𝑝 says that the ideally reliable agent is justified in believing 𝑝.
The difference between Ideal Reliability and Ideal Justified Reliability will prove irrelevant for
the purposes of our discussion. Our main discussion (§§3&4) will consider a series of cases where
an ideally reliable agent’s subjective degree of coldness gradually changes. We see no reason why
the setup cannot be tweaked, so that the agent possesses one’s favourite kind of internalist justi-
fication whenever they are confident that they feel cold. If you like, imagine that whenever the
threshold for confidence is reached, the agent undergoes perceptual or introspective seemings
of the right sort, or otherwise gains internalist evidence that they feel cold, or comes to possess
additional grounds of the kind that make for rational or blameless or epistemically permissible
belief. Because the setup can be unproblematically tweaked in this way, we will henceforth ignore
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any justification condition in the formulation of Ideal Reliability, assuming if necessary that con-
fidence is correlated with justification of the relevant kind.
Third, Ideal Reliability is not an analysis of knowledge. It claims nothing about the knowledge
of normal agents or agents in general, only ideally reliable ones. The spirit in which we offer the
principle is nothing like a full analysis, but as an attempt to gain some theoretical purchase on the
connection between confidence and knowledge.
Fourth, we only rely essentially on Ideal Reliability in one of our two main arguments. Later
we will argue against both Luminosity and Confidence Safety. Ideal Reliability plays an essential
role only in the second case. By contrast, our argument against Luminosity does not assume Ideal
Reliability: we argue against Luminosity using the different assumption that knowledge implies
confidence. So those skeptical of Ideal Reliability can still find much of interest in what follows.
Notice finally that Ideal Reliability has virtually no substantive implications on its own. In order
for interesting consequences to be drawn, it must be supplemented with a substantive account of
the confidence profile of an ideally reliable agent; this is the task that will occupy us in §3. Pre-
vious writers on luminosity have offered conflicting conceptions of ideal reliability and have put
these conceptions to work in arguing for or against Confidence Safety. Defenders of Luminosity
have suggested that the ideally reliable confidence in 𝑝 is simply the degree to which 𝑝 is true.
By contrast, opponents of Luminosity have suggested that the ideally reliable agent’s degree of
confidence in 𝑝 is 1 when 𝑝 is true and 0 when 𝑝 is false. In the next section, we argue that both
of these proposals are misguided, and go on to offer our own view.
3.1 Two theories of ideal reliability
3.1.1 Calibration
Leitgeb (2002), Berker (2008), Ramachandran (2009), and Cohen (2010) defend Calibration: the
view that an ideally reliable agent’s degree of confidence that she feels cold is precisely her degree
of subjective coldness.14 Here is a representative example:
Why should we withhold the honorific ‘reliable’ [in cases which Confidence Safety
diagnoses as not being knowledge]? What if one’s degree of confidence in its being
the case that 𝑝 perfectly tracks the underlying basis for its being the case that 𝑝, so
that one’s degree of confidence that 𝑝 falls just short of belief at the precise point at
which things fall just short ofmaking it the case that𝑝?Whywould that be a situation
in which one’s initial belief that 𝑝 is not reliable enough to constitute knowledge?
(Berker, 2008, p. 12)
Two things are happening here. One is that Berker is offering a substantive conception of ideal
reliability. The other is that Berker is implicitly endorsing a version of Ideal Reliability (when he
suggests that an ideally reliable agent’s confidence ought to count as knowledge).
A commitment to both Calibration and Ideal Reliability can also be found in Ramachandran:
[Confidence Safety] rule[s] out luminosity in the hypothesized perfect-calibration sit-
uation, which is daft, because one couldn’t be any more reliable. (Ramachandran,
2009 p. 668)
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Let us assume that degrees of subjective coldness can be normalized to the same scale as degrees
of confidence. For the sake of simplicity, let us also assume that the Lockean threshold for outright
confidence, 𝑙, is the same as the threshold for feeling cold, 𝑐.15
(12) Cutoff Identification. 𝑐 = 𝑙
Calibration—the view that the ideal degree of confidence that one feels cold is simply one’s degree
of subjective coldness—can then be stated. Where 𝐶!
𝑖
is the ideally reliable agent’s confidence
profile at a world where they are cold to degree 𝑖:
(13) Calibration. 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) = 𝑖
Many defenders of Luminosity have found Calibration to be an appealing conception of ideally
reliable confidence, since it provides a way to resist the anti-luminosity argument. Here is one
way of reconstructing their line of thought. (Note how it appeals to Ideal Reliability). From the
background setup, 𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 whenever 𝑖 > 𝑐. But according to Calibration, whenever 𝑖 > 𝑐,
we have:
(14) 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) = 𝑖 > 𝑐 = 𝑙
Thus the agent is outright confident in𝑝 and hence, by Ideal Reliability, knows that𝑝. It follows
that Luminosity holds for the ideal agent. In addition, it is relevant that Confidence Safety fails:
the ideally reliable agent knows 𝑝 when they are just above the threshold for coldness. But there
is a nearby case, just below the threshold, in which the agent’s confidence is almost the same and
in which 𝑝 is false. Thus Calibration can be used to argue that Confidence Safety fails.
3.1.2 Vindication
In defense of anti-luminosity, Srinivasan (2013) argues that, contra Calibration, calibrated agents
are systematically unreliable. Her main complaint is that calibrated agents have a fairly high
degree of confidence that they feel cold even in cases where they do not feel cold. To see why,
suppose the cutoff for feeling cold is 0.7; then a calibrated agent whose subjective degree of cold-
ness is 0.69 would not feel cold, but would nevertheless have fairly high confidence—0.69—that
they do feel cold.
For this reason Srinivasan offers a rival conception of ideally reliable confidence according to
which it is fully invested in the truth. If the agent does in fact feel cold, then their ideally reliable
degree of confidence in 𝑝 is 1; and if not, it is 0.16 We will call this view Vindication:
(15) Vindication. 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) =
{
1 if 𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖
0 otherwise.
Vindication may well be psychologically unrealistic for creatures like us, since it requires discon-
tinuous assignments of confidence. This is no objection: the claim concerns ideal reliability, not
the capacities of creatures like us.
10 GOLDSTEIN andWAXMAN
How does Vindication bear on the anti-luminosity argument? The dialectic is subtle. Vindica-
tion cannot be used directly to rule out Luminosity. If an agent possesses vindicated degrees of
confidence, then Ideal Reliability and Vindication imply that they know they feel cold iff they feel
cold. So Luminosity holds for them. So Ideal Reliability and Vindication allow that Luminosity
holds for certain agents, provided that they closely enough approximate ideal reliability. However,
this is cold comfort to defenders of the claim that there are non-trivial luminous mental states for
creatures similar to us. As Berker and Srinivasan note, actual physical systems rarely exhibit the
requisite kind of discontinuity.
The real reason why Vindication appeals to opponents of Luminosity (applied to actual, as
opposed to ideal, agents) is that it allows Confidence Safety to be defended against Calibrationist
criticism. For although vindicated agents satisfy Luminosity, they also satisfy Confidence Safety.
Consider a casewhere the agent is just above the threshold for coldness. There𝑝 is true, so the vin-
dicated agent has confidence to degree 1 in 𝑝, and therefore knows 𝑝. But the only nearby worlds
where the agent has a similar degree of confidence are those in which 𝑝 is also true; in any nearby
world on the other side of the threshold for feeling cold, the agent’s degree of confidence shifts
abruptly to 0. So, according to Vindication, ideally reliable agents provide no basis for rejecting
Confidence Safety, and thus the anti-luminosity argument (for non-ideal agents) threatens.
The upshot of all of this is an impasse. The proponent of Luminosity accepts Calibration, and
on that basis rejects Confidence Safety. The opponent of Luminosity accepts Vindication, and thus
sees no argument against Confidence Safety. Both Calibration and Vindication possess a certain
intuitive plausibility. If we think of one’s degree of subjective coldness as the degree to which it is
true that one feels cold, then Calibration seems highly attractive: who could bemore reliable than
an agent whose confidence tracks the degree to which the proposition in question is true? But
if we think about things in an all-or-nothing way, then Vindication seems highly attractive: who
could bemore reliable than an agent whose confidence is alwaysmaximally invested in the truth?
We propose a simple resolution: both Calibration and Vindication are false. Confidence does
not ideally track either degrees of truth or monadic truth, but rather tracks objective chance.
3.2 A new theory of ideal reliability
Consider the following passage from Srinivasan:
A confidence just short of outright belief in 𝑝 will yield some cases in which one uses
𝑝 in one’s practical reasoning despite not believing 𝑝 outright. . . [such an agent] has
some tendency to use that false proposition as a premise in her practical decision-
making. If she were making several. . .decisions at the same time, we could expect to
see [that agent] acting on [p] when it is false. (Srinivasan, 2013, 21)
The compelling thought here is that there is something unreliable about an agent who satisfies
Calibration. Such an agent tends to rely on 𝑝 in practical reasoning even in nearby cases where
𝑝 is false. (Indeed, Srinivasan makes the stronger claim that such an agent will be too unreliable
to know that 𝑝. For our purposes, all that is needed is the weaker claim that such an agent is not
ideally reliable. If true, this is enough to refute Calibration.)
But while we find the thought compelling, we wish to draw a different lesson than Srinivasan.
We agree that an ideally reliable agent relies on 𝑝 only if 𝑝 is true: but we think that this condition
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applies also to nearby scenarios. To express this idea, let𝑅!𝑝 be the claim that the ideal agent relies
on 𝑝. Then we propose:
(16) Ideality. 𝐶ℎ(𝑅!𝑝 ↔ 𝑝 ∣ 𝑁) = 1
Ideality captures a crucial modal aspect of reliability. Suppose 𝑝 is true in the actual world but
false in all nearby worlds. According to Vindication, an ideally reliable agent must rely on 𝑝 in all
the nearby ¬𝑝 worlds. But this is doubtful; an agent who is fully reliable with respect to 𝑝 surely
relies on 𝑝 in a nearby world 𝑤 if and only if 𝑝 is true at 𝑤.
Although Ideality could reasonably be taken as a premise without further argument, it is worth
mentioning that it is independently supported by a plausible conception of reliance. Recall that
confidence is a measure of an agent’s disposition to rely in practical reasoning. This suggests that
the ‘ideally reliable’ degrees of confidence are those that produce the best practical reasoning—
reasoning that best satisfies the agent’s desires.
(17) Pragmatism. 𝐶!(⋅) is the degree of confidence function that maximizes utility in nearby
cases.
But a very natural account of reliance can bemodeled on the pragmatic accounts of belief found in
Stalnaker (1984) andWeatherson (2005): S relies on 𝑝 iff for all relevant choices A and B, S prefers
A to B iff one prefers A and p to B and p. And given that rational agents maximize expected utility,
this yields:
(18) Reliance By Action. A rational agent relies on 𝑝 iff they perform whichever action maxi-
mizes expected utility given 𝑝.
Dispositionalism, Pragmatism, and Reliance By Action imply Ideality. By Dispositionalism and
Pragmatism, the ideal degree of confidence is equal to the chance of relying on 𝑝 that wouldmaxi-
mize utility at nearbyworlds. Now consider some nearbyworld 𝑣 to𝑤.Which propositions should
an agent rely on at 𝑣, in order to maximize their utility? Reliance By Action says that to rely on 𝑝
is to perform whichever action maximizes expected utility given 𝑝. Now imagine that the agent
relies on all and only the claims that are true. In that case, they will perform whichever action
maximizes their actual utility at 𝑣. This is exactly what Pragmatism requires. In other words, the
modal profile of action that best maximizes utility is for the agent to rely on 𝑝 at a world iff 𝑝 holds
there; that is to say, Ideality holds.17
3.3 Objectivism
We now show that Ideality leads to a rival conception of ideal confidence, according to which it
tracks objective chance:
(19) Objectivism. 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) = 𝐶ℎ𝑖(𝑝 ∣ 𝑁𝑖)
Objectivism is a straightforward consequence of Dispositionalism and Ideality. An agent’s con-
fidence in 𝑝 is the chance she relies on 𝑝 in nearby worlds. An ideal agent relies on 𝑝 in a nearby
world iff 𝑝. So an ideal agent’s confidence in 𝑝 is simply the chance of 𝑝 in nearby worlds.
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We can now see the problem in the argument from Srinivasan (2013) quoted above. The argu-
ment assumes that when an agent has a fairly high degree of confidence in a false proposition, she
will be somewhat disposed to rely on 𝑝 in situations where 𝑝 is false. But this is not necessarily
so. Even though 𝑝 is actually false, 𝑝 may be true in the nearby worlds in which she relies on 𝑝.
If an agent is ideally reliable, she will not be disposed to rely on whatever is actually true; rather,
she will be disposed to rely on whatever is true at the world in which she relies on it.
3.4 Consequences of Objectivism
Objectivism allows us to make a variety of interesting predictions about ideal degrees of confi-
dence. To see these predictions, we introduce a pair of simplifying assumptions which together
allow us to derive some results about ideal confidence. Not much turns on the particular assump-
tions we make, but they make the exposition considerably easier. In the appendix, we present
more complex analogues of our results that hold independently of the simplifying assumptions.
The first assumption, Indifference, is that the chance function at anyworld 𝑖 (𝐶ℎ𝑖) is indifferent
about the worlds in our model: every degree of subjective coldness has the same prior degree of
chance. The second assumption, Centering, concerns the nearness relation. In the gradual-change
scenario being considered, it is compelling to think of worlds as being nearby to one another if
their degrees of subjective coldness are within a distance parameter 𝑑.18,19 We also assume that
𝑑 <
1
2
, to avoid the trivializing consequence that the agent’s confidence in 𝑝 is 1
2
at every world.
Together, Indifference and Centering imply that the chances are symmetric. When an agent
feels cold to some degree 𝑖, they are just as likely to feel warmer than to feel colder. This symmetry
implies that when an agent feels cold, the chance that they feel cold is at least 0.5. For this reason,
we’ll refer to the combination of our two assumptions as Symmetry:
(20) Symmetry.
a. Indifference. 𝐶ℎ𝑖(𝑤𝑗) = 𝐶ℎ𝑖(𝑤𝑘)
b. Centering. 𝑁𝑖 = {𝑤𝑗 ∣ |𝑖 − 𝑗| < 𝑑} where 𝑑 < 1
2
In the presence of Symmetry, Objectivismprecisely specifies the ideal agent’s confidence. Given
Objectivism, the ideally reliable agent’s confidence in 𝑝 is the chance of 𝑝 in nearby worlds. By
Centering, the nearby worlds to 𝑤𝑖 are those in the interval (𝑖 − 𝑑, 𝑖 + 𝑑); their chance measure
is thus 2𝑑. The chance of 𝑝 within this region is simply the proportion of such worlds where the
degree of coldness is greater than 𝑐, the cutoff point for coldness.
Observation 2. Suppose Cutoff and Symmetry. Then Objectivism implies that:
𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1 if 𝑐 < 𝑖 − 𝑑
𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
if 𝑖 − 𝑑 < 𝑐 < 𝑖 + 𝑑
0 if 𝑐 > 𝑖 + 𝑑
(Proofs of observations can be found an appendix.)
We can also understand Observation 2 diagramatically, as in Figure 1. An ideal agent’s confi-
dence in 𝑝 corresponds to the region of nearby space where 𝑝 holds:
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F IGURE 1 Ideal confidence [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Objectivism differs markedly from the rival views in the literature. Compare Vindication first.
Given Dispositionalism, Vindication amounts to the claim that if 𝑝 is actually true, then the
chance that an ideal agent relies on 𝑝 in nearby worlds is 1. But as we have argued, this is non-
ideal: when the agent just barely feels cold, Vindication requires them to rely on 𝑝 in all nearby
worlds, including some where 𝑝 is false.
Calibration fares similarly. It amounts to the claim that in 𝑤𝑖 , the proportion of nearby worlds
in which the ideal agent relies on 𝑝 is 𝑖 itself. But by considering worlds where the agent just
barely feels cold, we can see that Calibration also requires them to rely on feeling cold in some
worlds where they do not feel cold. Again, by our lights, this is non-ideal.
Objectivism is a novel and plausible account of ideally reliable confidence. What is its bearing
on the anti-luminosity argument? We turn to that question now.
4 ANTI-LUMINOSITY REGAINED
In this section, we develop a new anti-luminosity argument. The details are complex, so we pro-
vide an informal summary of the argument here. Knowledge requires high confidence. So the
ideally reliable agent knows that she is cold only if she is highly confident that she is cold. But our
theory of ideal confidence predicts that there are cases where the ideally reliable agent is cold and
yet is not highly confident that she is cold. This occurs for example when the agent is just barely
over the threshold for being cold. In this case, about half of the nearby worlds are ones in which
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the agent is not cold; and so her degree of confidence that she is cold is only about 0.5, below the
threshold required by knowledge.
We now develop this argument more precisely. First, before getting into the details, we estab-
lish some basic properties of our theory, connecting confidence with truth and with knowledge.
Throughout, we hold fixed two previous simplifying assumptions: Cutoff (that an agent is cold at
𝑤𝑖 iff 𝑖 exceeds the cutoff 𝑐) and Symmetry.
In the presence of these assumptions, Objectivism implies that 𝑝 is true just in case the ideally
reliable agent’s confidence in 𝑝 is greater than 1
2
:
Observation 3. Suppose Cutoff and Symmetry. Then Objectivism implies that 𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 iff
𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) >
1
2
.
Observation 3 connects ideal confidence and truth; our next observation connects ideal confi-
dence and knowledge. The ideally reliable agent knows 𝑝 at𝑤𝑖 just in case 𝑖 > 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑. To see
why, first note that Observation 3 implies that ideal confidence is factive.
(21) Factivity. 𝐶!𝑝 → 𝑝
Next, we make a crucial assumption: that knowledge implies all-or-nothing confidence.
(22) KC. 𝐾𝑝 → 𝐶𝑝
The motivation for 𝐾𝐶 comes from the facts that all-or-nothing confidence can be viewed as a
form of all-or-nothing belief, and the principle that knowledge requires belief.20
Given KC and Ideal Reliability, the ideally reliable agent knows 𝑝 iff she is confident in 𝑝:
(23) Collapse. 𝐶!𝑝 ↔ 𝐾!𝑝
Collapse is not an analysis of knowledge, since it only concerns ideally reliable knowledge. But
Collapse lets us test whether an ideally reliable agent knows 𝑝. Summarizing:
Observation 4.
4.1 Suppose Cutoff and Symmetry. Then Objectivism and Lockeanism imply Factivity.
4.2 Factivity, KC, and Ideal Reliability imply Collapse.
Collapse characterizes ideal knowledge in terms of ideal confidence. Objectivism characterized
ideal confidence in terms of objective chance. When we chain these characterizations together,
we reach a simple account of ideal knowledge:
Observation 5. Suppose Cutoff, Cutoff Identification, and Symmetry. Then Objectivism, Lock-
eanism, KC, and Ideal Reliability imply 𝐾!𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 iff 𝑖 > 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑.
(We summarize our results so far in Figure 2.)
With these results in place, we can return to the anti-luminosity argument. It turns out that
our theory rules out Luminosity, even without appeal to Ideal Reliability, puts severe pressure
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F IGURE 2 Truth and knowledge
on Confidence Safety, and is consistent with ordinary coarse-grained Safety. Thus, our theory
generates a new anti-luminosity argument and provides a philosophical framework for assessing
a family of safety principles.
4.1 Luminosity
We now argue that Luminosity is false. Consider a weakened form of Luminosity concerning
ideally reliable agents:
(24) Ideal Luminosity. 𝑝 → 𝐾!𝑝
To show that Ideal Luminosity fails, we rely on our previous observation that the ideally reliable
agent knows 𝑝 at 𝑤𝑖 iff 𝑖 > 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑. It follows that there is a range of degrees of coldness
where the ideally reliable agent feels cold but is not confident that she feels cold, and hence by KC
does not know. Say that Ideal Luminosity fails at 𝑤𝑖 just in case 𝑝 is true there while 𝐾!𝑝 is false.
Then:
Observation 6. Suppose Cutoff, Cutoff Identification, and Symmetry. Then Objectivism, Lock-
eanism, KC, and Ideal Reliability imply that:
1. Ideal Luminosity fails at 𝑤𝑖 iff 𝑐 < 𝑖 < 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑.
2. Ideal Luminosity fails at some 𝑤𝑖 iff 𝑐 > 0.5.
The failure of Ideal Luminosity sharply distinguishes Objectivism from Calibration and Vindi-
cation. As we showed in §3, these rival views both entail that ideal agents are luminous.
This discussion provides a newkind of anti-luminosity argument. On our view, Luminosity fails
in a wide range of cases, even for ideally reliable agents, and therefore does not hold in general.
This argument doesn’t appeal in any way to Confidence Safety. This is no accident; Confidence
Safety is no part of our view. We therefore have an anti-luminosity argument that avoids the most
controversial assumptions of previous arguments to the same effect.
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In fact, our argument against Luminosity can be strengthened significantly. The observation
above relies on Ideal Reliability to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for Luminosity
violations. But the right to left directions of Observation 6 can be established without appeal to
Ideal Reliability. Those directionsmerely require a case where 𝑝 is true and𝐾!𝑝 false, which given
𝐾𝐶 requires only that 𝐶!𝑝 is false. We can use the assumptions above without Ideal Reliability to
show that this occurs if 𝑐 < 𝑖 < 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑, which holds for some 𝑖 iff 𝑐 > 0.5.
It is true that our model includes simplifying assumptions such as Symmetry and Cutoff Iden-
tification. But the argument is robust; it could be made without them, given any other reasonable
conception of the objective chances. Assuming Objectivism, Luminosity holds only if the chances
conspired precisely so that the chance at 𝑖 of 𝑝 in nearby worlds is greater than 𝑙 whenever 𝑖 > 𝑐.
For Luminosity to hold in general, this constraint on the chances would have to hold in general,
but we see no plausible way to motivate such a requirement. It certainly does not correspond to
any of the distinctive theses in epistemology or the philosophy ofmind towhich defenders of lumi-
nosity typically appeal. Discussion of models without these simplifying assumptions is deferred,
for the sake of readibility, to an appendix.21
4.2 Confidence safety
We now show that our theory is not only not committed to Confidence Safety, but also predicts
that it fails in a wide range of cases. Again, we consider a version of Confidence Safety for ideal
agents.
(25) Ideal Confidence Safety. If 𝐾!𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 and 𝐶!𝑖 (𝑝) ≈ 𝐶
!
𝑗
(𝑝), then 𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑗 .
Confidence Safety implies Ideal Confidence Safety. We will characterize the conditions under
which Ideal Confidence Safety fails.
Confidence Safety is formulated in terms of a similarity relation≈ between two degrees of con-
fidence 𝐶𝑖(𝑝) and 𝐶𝑗(𝑝). It is helpful to introduce a similarity parameter, so that 𝐶𝑖(𝑝) and 𝐶𝑗(𝑝)
count as sufficiently similar just in case the distance between them is less than 𝑠:
(26) Similarity. 𝐶𝑖(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶𝑗(𝑝) iff |𝐶𝑖(𝑝) − 𝐶𝑗(𝑝)| < 𝑠
For simplicity, we assumed earlier that the thresholds for coldness and confidence are identical.
In the same vein we assume that two degrees of confidence are sufficiently similar when they are
indiscernible, and that the threshold of indiscernibility for degrees of confidence is identical to
the threshold of indiscernibility for degrees of coldness:
(27) Distance Identification. 𝑑 = 𝑠
In our theory, the validity of Ideal Confidence Safety amounts to a constraint on the values
of 𝑑 and 𝑐. Say that Ideal Confidence Safety fails at 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑗 just in case 𝐾!𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 ,
𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝), and yet 𝑝 is false at 𝑤𝑗 . Then:
Observation 7. Suppose Cutoff, Cutoff Identification, Distance Identification, and Symmetry.
Then Objectivism, Lockeanism, KC, and Ideal Reliability imply that:
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1. Ideal Confidence Safety fails at𝑤𝑖 and𝑤𝑗 iff (a) 𝑖 > 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑, (b) |𝑖 − 𝑗| < 2𝑑2, (c) 𝑗 ≤ 𝑐, and
(d) 𝑐 − 𝑑 < 𝑖 < 𝑐 + 𝑑 and 𝑐 − 𝑑 < 𝑗 < 𝑐 + 𝑑.
2. Ideal Confidence Safety fails at some 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑤𝑗 iff 𝑐 − 𝑑 <
1
2
.
The way in which our theory undermines Confidence Safety is not as straightforward as its
treatment of Luminosity. As we saw, Luminosity fails immediately, since given our background
assumptions it is provably violated by ideally reliable agents. Confidence Safety, by contrast, is
consistent with our view provided that the 𝑐, 𝑙, 𝑑 and 𝑠 parameters are finely-tuned in exactly
the right way. But once the thesis is seen to be so sensitive to the particular parameters in play,
its plausibility diminishes considerably. Confidence Safety is offered as a general constraint on
knowledge. Presumably then, if it is true, it is generally applicable, i.e. it is necessarily true and
constrains not just knowledge of whether one feels cold but knowledge in general. But even if
it happens to be that the relevant parameters for the mental state of feeling cold line up in the
way required for Confidence Safety to hold, it is beyond the bounds of plausibility to hold that
they do so for every mental state capable of undergoing gradual change. Furthermore, even if the
parameters do line up, they presumably do so only contingently; so even if there are no actual
failures of Confidence Safety, there are at least possible ones.22 Thus, in light of our discussion, we
see no reasonable way to preserve Confidence Safety as a general epistemological principle.23
4.3 Safety
Our theory provides a principled way to reject Confidence Safety. It is natural to wonder whether
our framework is generally hostile to safety principles. As a test case, we consider a coarse-grained
safety principle according to which knowledge requires safe all-or-nothing confidence.
Let Safety be the principle that if an agent knows that 𝑝, then in any nearby cases in which they
are confident in 𝑝, it must be the case that 𝑝 is true.24,25
(28) Safety. If 𝐾𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 and 𝐶𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖 , then 𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑗 .
We now consider whether Objectivism is compatible with Safety, focusing again on ideal
agents:
(29) Ideal Safety. If 𝐾!𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 and 𝐶!𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖 , then 𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑗 .
We saw above that our theory implies that ideal all-or-nothing confidence is factive. This imme-
diately implies that Ideal Safety is valid.Whenever an ideal agent knows 𝑝, 𝑝 is bound by Factivity
to be true in any nearby case where she is confident in 𝑝.
Observation 8. Suppose Cutoff and Symmetry. Then Objectivism and Lockeanism imply
Ideal Safety.
Ideally reliable agents thus satisfy Safety. Since the degrees of confidence of non-ideal agents are
not constrained in any further way by our theory, it follows that it is consistent with Safety. This is
a pleasing result: coarse-grained safety principles possess considerable plausibility; indeed, they
are accepted by many proponents and opponents of luminosity alike. It would have been a mark
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against our theory if the most natural confidence-theoretic principles of this kind were ruled out.
Fortunately, that is not the case. In this way, our theory provides the tools to distinguish between
valid and invalid safety conditions on knowledge.
5 CONCLUSION: FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR CONFIDENCE
The primary aim of this paper has been to develop a theory of confidence, explore some of its
connections to knowledge, and assess the anti-luminosity argument in its light. In this concluding
section, we briefly explore the extent to which the Dispositionalist view of confidence introduced
the papermotivates various structural constraints on degrees of confidence, address some possible
concerns about the notion, and gesture towards some further philosophical applications.
5.1 Structural constraints on confidence
Anatural question is whether the account of confidence we have offered gives rise to any substan-
tive structural constraints on degrees of confidence—the most salient being whether an agent’s
(or a rational agent’s) degrees of confidence must satisfy the axioms of probability.26
Probabilism imposes three synchronic norms on degrees of belief: that they can be represented
by real numbers in the interval [0, 1], that every tautology is assigned degree 1, and that they are
additive, so that for any exclusive 𝑝 and 𝑞, the agent’s degree of belief in 𝑝 or 𝑞 is the sum of her
degree of belief in 𝑝 and in 𝑞.
The Dispositionalist theory of confidence immediately satisfies the first requirement of prob-
abilism, since it views degrees of confidence as chances of a certain kind, which therefore fall in
the interval [0, 1].
Whether our theory satisfies the second requirement depends on the theory of reliance. The
constraint corresponds to the requirement that (rational) agents always rely on tautologies in prac-
tical reasoning. This seems an innocent initial assumption, and one that is especially plausible on
the pragmatic theory of reliance discussed in §3.
Crucially, however, our theory rejects the additivity requirement on confidence. Our theory is
superadditive: an agent’s confidence in a disjunction can exceed the sumof her confidence in each
disjunct. To see why, return to the case of a fair lottery. An agent’s degree of confidence that her
ticket will either win or lose is 1, since the chance that she relies on this in practical reasoning is 1.
However, her degree of confidence in each disjunctmay be 0: after all, shemaynot rely at all on her
ticket losing while simultaneously not relying at all on her ticket winning. Examples of this sort
are no mere edge cases, but are important to the way in which confidence is initially motivated,
by Williamson and those following him, as a state distinct from credence. Furthermore, at least
prima facie, it is plausible that a rational agent’s dispositions to rely can have this structure, in
which case additivity is neither a constraint on agents in general nor on rational agents. Here the
key point is that on our theory, degrees of confidence are understood not in terms of dispositions
to take bets (as credences are, on the traditional conception), but rather in terms of dispositions to
rely. As a result, interestingly different structural constraints arise for degrees of confidence than
for credences, classically conceived.
Our denial of additivity raises the question of whether other rational requirements on confi-
dence can be motivated. A natural weakening to consider is a rule of comparative entailment:
that whenever 𝑝 entails 𝑞, an agent’s degree of confidence in 𝑝 should not exceed her confidence
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in 𝑞. One way to motivate this constraint would be to argue that it is necessary for all agents, in
virtue of the fact that reliance is itself closed under logical entailment. Such a claim would be
roughly analogous to the well-known thesis of Stalnaker (1984) that belief is closed under logical
entailment.27 A different version of this constraint might be motivated by showing that rational
agents must conform to it. One argument to this effect can be sketched as follows: if an agent is
rational in relying on 𝑝, then they are rational in acting in such a way that presupposes that 𝑝 is
true. But if 𝑝 is true, and 𝑝 entails 𝑞, then 𝑞 must also be true. So—at least to the extent that the
truth of 𝑞 is relevant to the decisions facing the agent—failing to rely on 𝑞 seems to give rise to
pragmatic incoherence, and hence, arguably, irrationality.
Our discussion here is far from conclusive; much work remains to be done in exploring con-
straints on confidence. The examples above suggest a general strategy: by analogy with Dutch
Book arguments in the case of credence, we can evaluate whether a pattern of confidence is ratio-
nal by considering whether its associated dispositions are pragmatically appropriate.28
A final observation to make is that, on natural background assumptions, all three theories of
ideally reliable confidence considered in §3 imply that the degrees of confidence of an ideally reli-
able agent are indeed probabilistic. Since ideal reliability in the sense discussed is an idealization
more akin to assuming full information than perfect rationality, we do not take this observation to
conflict with our claim above that probabilism about confidence is not rationally required. Nev-
ertheless, we think it is potentially interesting that, on all of the natural views, agents who are
idealized along a salient epistemic dimension satisfy probabilism. The confidence profile of ide-
ally reliable agents may satisfy additional constraints: for instance, Objectivism together with the
Principal Principle (Lewis, 1980) imply that an ideal agent who knows the chances (and no inad-
missible information) will identify them with both her credence and her degrees of confidence.
Again, we leave further investigation for future work.
5.2 The theoretical role of confidence
Some readers might reasonably wonder about the acceptability of the concept of confidence. Is it
in good standing, and even if so, is it capable of earning its philosophical keep? If confidence does
not have much theoretical utility, one might worry that the important epistemological role that
we assign it is undermotivated. In that case, our results above would be of limited interest.
An immediate point to make is that a certain kind of scepticism about the notion is misplaced.
Our account of confidence explainswhat it is for an agent to be confident in a proposition using the
notions of (i) objective chance and (ii) reliance by an agent on a proposition. Anyone who accepts
these resources ought to accept that confidence, so defined, exists—it is not simply a philosophi-
cal fiction.
But even granted that our notion of confidence is in good standing, it does not follow that it plays
a significant theoretical role. In particular, we’ve relied on the principle that knowledge requires
confidence; but this might be disputed if confidence turned out to be an artificial notion tailor-
made to a particular argument. We’ve already discussed several links between confidence and
the theory of knowledge. In this final subsection, we consider further applications of confidence
in epistemology and the theory of action. None of these applications are conclusive; indeed, we
hope to explore some further in future work. We include them here because we think that they
potentially strengthen the case for confidence: if it really can play some or all of these additional
roles, it is more plausible that it is linked to knowledge in the ways discussed above.
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A first potential application of confidence concerns puzzles about the epistemic significance
of merely statistical evidence. In cases of merely statistical evidence, an agent’s only information
about whether 𝑝 concerns the objective chance of 𝑝. In this way, cases of merely statistical evi-
dence resemble Lottery Bag. Consider the following case from the legal realm:
(30) Blue Bus. Mary’s car is hit by a blue bus. Mary knows that 80% of blue buses are owned
by the Blue Bus Company (BBC), and 20% by the Red Bus Company. Mary has no other
evidence about which company owned the bus.
In Blue Bus, Mary has merely statistical evidence for 𝑝. Buchak (2014) observes that merely
statistical evidence licenses quite different behavior than other kinds of evidence:
(31) Green Bus. Mary’s car is hit by a green bus. Mary knows that Half of all green buses are
owned by the Green Bus Company (GBC), and half by the Yellow Bus Company. Mary also
knows that an eyewitness identifies the bus as belonging to the Green Bus company. Eyewit-
ness reports are 80% reliable in general.
In Blue Bus, Mary’s credence that BBC is responsible is 0.8. This is the same as her credence
thatGBC is responsible inGreenBus.Nonetheless, Buchak (2014) argues thatMary should behave
differently in the two cases. In Green Bus, Mary can permissibly blame GBC for the accident; but
she cannot blame BBC in Blue Bus. Buchak (2014) suggests that this difference in permissibility
tracks a corresponding epistemic difference: Mary believes that BBC is responsible in Blue Bus;
but she does not believe that GBC is responsible in Green Bus. In this way, Buchak (2014) uses
this case to argue against a simple form of Lockeanism, on which belief is simply high credence.
A natural explanation of these examples appeals to confidence. In Green Bus, Mary is disposed
to rely on GBC being responsible. She manifests this disposition by blaming GBC, taking them
to court, etc. In Blue Bus, Mary has a low degree of disposition to rely on BBC being responsible.
Thus we can explicate Buchak (2014)’s distinction by suggesting that belief requires a high degree
of confidence, and not merely a high degree of credence. This in turn strengthens our case for the
assumption that knowledge requires high confidence.
To defend this proposal in detail, we need to explain why Mary can rationally have different
degrees of confidence in the two cases. Our earlier account of ideal reliability does not make
the necessary prediction. The objective chance of the relevant company being responsible is not
higher in Blue Bus than in Green Bus. So the ideally reliable agent’s confidence is no higher in
Green Bus.
On the other hand, ordinary rational agents are not ideally reliable. A natural next step is then
to give a theory of the rational norms on confidence for ordinary agents, once we have left the
realm of ideal reliability behind. For example, perhaps there is a further kind of safety norm on
degrees of confidence, which forbids agents to foresee that they will rely on 𝑝 at a nearby world
where 𝑝 is false.
(32) Safety*. 𝐶ℎ(𝑅𝑝 ∧ ¬𝑝) = 0
Imagine that in Blue BusMarywere to form a high degree of confidence that BBC is responsible
for the action. Then inmost nearbyworlds, shewould rely on BBCbeing responsible. SinceMary’s
evidence in Blue Bus is merely statistical, there are worlds consistent with her evidence in which
the Red Bus Company committed the crime. But Mary can foresee that if she relies on BBC being
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responsible at most nearby worlds, she will rely on BBC being responsible in a world where they
are not responsible. That is, Mary would know that there is a chance that she relies on 𝑝 when 𝑝
is false. Perhaps this is irrational.
By contrast, one might think that in cases of eyewitness testimony, there can be uncertainty
about whether the nearby worlds include ones in which Yellow Bus Company is responsible. If
Mary doesn’t know that the nearby worlds have this structure, then she doesn’t know that she
violates Safety*. On this proposal, the difference between merely statistical evidence and other
kinds of evidence concerns our knowledge about nearby worlds.
Safety* is interestingly weaker than Objectivism, because it allows that there are cases in which
𝑝 is true and an agent does not rely on𝑝, because she relies on neither𝑝 nor not𝑝. Safety* encodes
a norm to avoid relying on falsehoods; it does not require relying on every truth.
TheBlue Bus case is structurally similar to Lottery Bag. In Lottery Bag, the agent also hasmerely
statistical evidence about the ball. In Lottery Bag as in Blue Bus, the agent intuitively should not
rely on the relevant claim in practical reasoning. There is thus hope that Safety* can also explain
our judgments about Lottery Bag.
This isn’t the onlyway onemight appeal to confidence to explain the puzzle ofmerely statistical
evidence. Another option would be to appeal to the principle that if S knows that S doesn’t know
that 𝑝, then S’s degree of confidence that 𝑝 ought to be 0.
(33) Safety**. 𝐾¬𝐾𝑝 → 𝐶(𝑝) = 0
This might follow from a more general requirement: if you don’t know 𝑝 at 𝑤, then you
shouldn’t rely on 𝑝 at 𝑤. Then one could argue that in Blue Bus and Lottery Bag, the relevant
agent knows that she doesn’t know the relevant proposition. A natural next question is whether
one could motivate Safety** from facts about the nature of reliance or confidence. (For example,
Safety** might follow from the theory that an agent’s degree of confidence in 𝑝 is simply her cre-
dence that she knows 𝑝.)
A second potential application for the notion of confidence is in making sense of pragmatic
encroachment on knowledge. Consider the following pair of cases.29
(34) Low. Hannah made three sandwiches and placed them in the refrigerator. She told Sarah
that she placed the peanut butter sandwich on the left, the tuna sandwich in the middle,
and the almond butter sandwich on the right. Sarah knows that Almira has no allergies.
Almira says: ‘I’d love an almond butter sandwich.’ And so Sarah opens the refrigerator door,
points to the sandwich on the right, and says: ‘The sandwich on the right is an almond butter
sandwich. You can have it.’
(35) High. Just like Low, except it is Sarah’s nephew Algernon who is visiting for lunch, and
he has a severe peanut allergy. He asks Sarah for a sandwich. Sarah knows that the peanut
butter sandwich would be fatal to Algernon, but that the almond butter sandwich would be
harmless. She also knows that he would slightly prefer the almond butter sandwich to the
tuna sandwich. So she gives him the tuna sandwich.
In Low, Sarah knows that the sandwich on the right is made of almond butter; in High she does
not. In Low and High, Sarah has the same evidence. But in High, the practical stakes regarding
whether the sandwich is made of almond butter are much higher.
Above, we considered a pragmatic account of confidence, on which reliance was understood in
terms of preference. That account built on Weatherson (2005)’s theory of belief. For that reason,
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our theory gives a natural account of the cases above. In Low, Sarah’s degree of confidence in the
sandwich containing almonds is higher than her degree of confidence in High. The stakes do not
simply affect the threshold of credence required for justified belief; they affect the agent’s actual
level of confidence.30
Why do stakes affect levels of confidence? Our pragmatic account of reliance suggests an
answer. When the stakes regarding 𝑝 increase, the agent has a lower chance of relying on 𝑝 at
nearby worlds. After all, Reliance by Action says that an agent relies on 𝑝 when she performs the
action that maximizes expected utility given 𝑝. Let 𝑝 be the proposition that the sandwich on the
right contains almond butter, and let𝑅 be the action of giving the relevant person the sandwich on
the right. In Low and High, 𝑅 is the action that maximizes expected utility given 𝑝. In Low, Sarah
is highly disposed to perform 𝑅; in High, she is not. So our account of confidence immediately
predicts that Sarah’s degree of confidence in 𝑝 is high in Low, and low in High.
This explanation of pragmatic encroachment provides further support for KC. Given KC,
Sarah’s changing degrees of confidence generate different predictions about knowledge. Since in
High, Sarah has a low degree of confidence in 𝑝, Sarah does not count as knowing 𝑝. By contrast,
KC provides no barrier to knowing 𝑝 in Low.
We suspect that the theory of confidence may also be fruitfully applied to other interesting
questions in epistemology, at which we can only gesture here. First, the theory could be extended
into a theory of degrees of credence. On this picture, an agent’s credence in 𝑝 of, say, 1
2
could itself
come in degrees, depending on how robustly she is disposed to accept various odds. The reliability
of these degrees of confidence might then be of use in giving a theory of probabilistic knowledge
(Moss, 2018). Second, perhaps confidence can be used to distinguish between cases of risk and
uncertainty in a satisfying way. Finally, a natural question is whether we can extend our account
of ideal reliability to a full fledged analysis of knowledge. One possibility is that S knows that 𝑝
iff the ideally reliable agent knows 𝑝, S is confident in 𝑝, and S’s degree of confidence in 𝑝 is
sufficiently reliable, understood in terms of sufficient closeness to the ideal degree of confidence
in 𝑝.31
ENDNOTES
1 For responses toWilliamson (2000), see Leitgeb (2002), Berker (2008), Ramachandran (2009), andCohen (2010).
Srinivasan (2013) provides a recent defense of anti-luminosity.
2 Strictly speaking, luminosity is defined in terms of being in a position to know rather than knowing.Williamson
(2000, p. 95) glosses the notion as follows: “If one is in a position to know 𝑝, and one has done what one is
in a position to do to decide whether 𝑝 is true, then one does know 𝑝.” Following the literature, we make the
simplifying assumption that our agent does everything they are in a position to do to decidewhether the relevant
propositions are true.
3 The existence of a cutoff is (classically) equivalent to Williamson’s stipulations that the agent starts off feeling
cold, ends up not feeling cold, and warms up over time. The existence of a cutoff is a standard assumption about
gradable adjectives like cold; it is compatible with the vagueness of ‘feels cold’, since, for example, indeterminacy
in whether an agent feels cold can be understood in terms of indeterminacy about the location of the cutoff. See
Kennedy (2007) for a recent discussion of gradable adjectives, cutoffs, and their connection to vagueness.
More generally, some readers might worry that the appeal to cutoffs will lead to soritical arguments in what
follows. Here we appeal to something like the response in Williamson (2000, p. 104): if an argument is soritical,
then the result of precisifying vague terms in the premises leads to a reduction in their plausibility. But when
‘feels cold’ and ‘is confident’ are replaced by precisifications ‘feels cold to degree𝑚’ and ‘is confident to degree 𝑛’,
our premises become even more plausible. Williamson’s original anti-luminosity argument has been criticized
(see e.g. Berker, 2008) for ignoring the possibility of penumbral connections; we discuss this issue further in
§4.2.
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4 Nothing turns on the particular value chosen here; for our purposes, we need only that degrees of coldness in the
interval [0,1] can be subdivided sufficiently finely that the agent’s confidence in ‘neighboring’ values is similar.
5 See Berker (2008), Schafer (2015), Schoenfield (2015), Srinivasan (2015), Williamson (2000), p. 110-113 and Dum-
mett (1978, p. 131).
6 See again Berker (2008) and Weatherson (2004).
7 We assume that an agent’s degrees of confidence occupy a ratio scale with a distinguished minimum (no con-
fidence) and distinguished maximum (full confidence), allowing their representation by a real-valued function
from the set of propositions to the interval [0,1]. For more on scales of measurement, see Krantz, Luce, Suppes,
and Tversky (1971).
8 The view in Manley and Wasserman (2008) is more complex, understanding degrees of disposition in terms
of cases rather than worlds. Each case is a precise specification of the background conditions relevant to the
disposition ascription (how high is the glass? how hard does the wind blow?).
9 Before continuing, it’s worth clarifying the notion of objective chance at issue. Throughout, we appeal to this
notion of chance to understand an agent’s degree of confidence in various claims. For this reason, it is important
that this chance function is not automatically opinionated about these propositions. So we cannot analyze an
agent’s present degrees of confidence in terms of the present chance function, since this will lead to opinionation
about all past facts, while an agent can have intermediate degrees of confidence about, say, whether it was cold
yesterday. In response to this problem, there are a variety of options we might rely on. Manley and Wasserman
(2008) offer two suggestions here (p. 80). First, they suggest relying on the Louiville measure on phase space,
which will help make sense of the proportional relationship between various claims about the world. Second,
they suggest that one could appeal to the kind ofWilliamsonian ur prior that many epistemologists have used to
make sense of evidential probability. Finally, departing from the suggestions in Manley and Wasserman (2008),
we could appeal to the chance function from the time right before various relevant propositions are intuitively
‘resolved’. One problem for this last proposal, however, is that itmight lead to troublewhen comparing an agent’s
degrees of confidence about propositions that are resolved at quite different times. Finally, one place where this
question affects our argument is when we suggest that any agent who defers their credences to the chances
will match their credences to their degrees of confidence. This result is only interesting if the releavnt notion of
chance in our argument is one to which rational agents defer.
10 The analogy is with Lockeanism concerning credence/belief. For more, see Foley (1993, 2009), Christensen
(2005), Sturgeon (2008), Beddor and Goldstein (2018), and Dorst (2018). For applications of Lockeanism in a
confidence-theoretic setting, see e.g. Srinivasan, 2013, p. 20.
11 Williamson, 2000, p. 98-9; see also Williamson, MS, p. 9 for a more recent endorsement. ‘Confidence’ may be
an infelicitous term for the notion, to the extent that it is intuitive to say that one’s degrees of confidence should
track known objective chances. Perhaps Williamson’s ‘degree of outright belief’ would be better; still, we stick
with ‘confidence’ given its entrenchment in the literature. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us to
address these points.
12 For discussion, see Wong (2008) and Cohen (2010).
13 Treatments of knowledge as safe belief are considered in Beddor and Pavese (forthcoming), Lasonen-Aarnio
(2010), Pritchard (2005), and in Williamson (2000) in a non-reductive form.
14 In their own words:
A calibrated system simply draws the relevant distinctions appropriately, such that there is no
danger of misapprehending a total state in which one does not feel cold by having the simultane-
ous belief that one does. (Leitgeb, 2002, p. 216)
[If Calibration is satisfied, then], at [𝑤𝑖] one just barely feels cold and one just barely believes
one feels cold. So how is one’s confidence at [𝑤𝑖] misplaced? Clearly one should not have more
confidence at [𝑤𝑖 .] (Cohen, 2010, p. 726)
For another potential defense of this view, see Zardini (2012).
15 If different thresholds for confidence and coldness are allowed, the statement of Calibration will be more com-
plex. The viewwould need to be tweaked so that the ideal agent’s degree of confidence in𝑝 exceeds the threshold
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for outright confidence exactly when 𝑖 exceeds the threshold for feeling cold. There is no guarantee in such a
scenario that 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) = 𝑖, but some analogue of this equation would hold with suitable scaling factors applied.
16 The crucial passage in which this suggestion is found is Srinivasan (2013)’s discussion, on p. 20, of the case
of Henrietta.
17 Several readers have suggested that Ideality makes strange predictions about the degrees of confidence of an
omniscient agent. One might think that God should have a degree of confidence of 1 in all the truths at any
world. But Ideality seems to predict that this is false. If 𝑝 is true at 𝑤 but could easily have been false, Ideality
predicts that the ideally reliable degree of confidence in 𝑝 is less than 1. We don’t see this as a serious objection
to Ideality, but rather as a helpful way of illustrating the view. Which degrees of confidence are ideal should
depend on what confidence is; and on our conception of confidence, there doesn’t seem to be any particular
reason why God would have maximal degrees of confidence. On the other hand, for those who are moved by
this worry, one option is to say that when we assess God’s degrees of confidence we use a conception of nearness
on which every world is uniquely near itself. On this conception, God would have maximal confidence in all
and only the truths.
18 Here our models are structurally similar to the distance-based models of epistemic accessibility explored in
Williamson (2011), Goodman (2013), and Carter (2018).
19 Interpreting ‘nearby’ is a matter of some delicacy. Another possible account is is that a world is nearby to 𝑤𝑖 iff
it is consistent with what is known by an agent at 𝑤𝑖 . On this view, Confidence Safety simply says that an agent
has a confidence of degree 1 in whatever they know. But there are independent reasons not to accept this view
of ‘nearby’. In particular, it has a trivializing effect on standard formulations of (coarse-grained) safety, e.g. that
knowledge requires no nearby false belief. (For if one knows 𝑝, then on this view there is no nearby case where
𝑝 is false, hence trivially no nearby case where one falsely believes 𝑝).
20 Even if all-or-nothing confidence and belief come apart, confidence—a disposition to rely on 𝑝—is very plausi-
bly necessary for belief that 𝑝. Earlier we considered reasons to be wary of a dispositional analysis of belief; but
these reasons challenge the sufficiency of the dispositional analysis, not its necessity.
21 As we noted earlier, Luminosity has often been formulated in terms of being in a position to know, rather than
knowing proper (Williamson, 2000). A defender of Luminositymight exploit this distinction to defend Luminos-
ity from our objection. On the resulting view, even though the ideal agent does not know 𝑝, she is in a position
to know 𝑝. Of course, to implement this view requires a substantive conception of being in a position to know.
For example, one might think that being in a position to know 𝑝 implies that if one has considered the question
of whether 𝑝 and formed a degree of confidence on this basis, then one knows 𝑝. On this conception of being
in a position to know, the ideal agent is not in a position to know, since she has a certain degree of confidence
in 𝑝 and yet does not know. On the other hand, another conception of being in a position to know, developed in
Cohen (1999) and endorsed in Schaffer (2007), suggests that an agent is in a position to know 𝑝 iff were she to
competently form a belief in 𝑝 on the basis of evidence she currently possesses, she would know 𝑝. One might
then argue that the ideal agent could raise her confidence in 𝑝 on the basis of her current evidence (feeling like
this) and thereby come to know.
If an ideal agent who is not confident in 𝑝 were to raise her confidence in 𝑝 while retaining her previous
evidence, shewould no longer be ideal in our sense. Thus our current theory does not issue an immediate verdict
about whether she would then know 𝑝. This allows some room for a version of Luminosity that appeals to being
in a position to know. However, one obstacle to this view is that it requires that non-ideal agents can knowmore
than ideal agents. That is: an agent could shift her degrees of confidence to become less reliable, and thereby
gain knowledge. This is difficult to accept. That being said, one way to investigate this view further might be to
give an analysis of knowledge where S knows that 𝑝 iff S is confident in 𝑝, 𝑝 is true, and S’s degree of confidence
in 𝑝 is sufficiently close to the ideal agent’s degree of confidence in 𝑝. Then one could characterize the range of
potential Luminosity violations in terms of this new parameter: sufficient proximity to ideal confidence.
22 The situation is even worse for the defender of Confidence Safety in light of the vagueness of ‘feels cold’ and ‘is
confident’. For Confidence Safety to hold in all precifications, these terms must be constrained by a penumbral
connection that forces the relevant parameters to line up. Since no natural philosophical thesis entails that the
parameters line up in this way, we should treat this as extremely implausible.
23 Cases where Confidence Safety fail are also plausibly cases where Williamson-style margin-for-error principles
fail, for 𝐾!𝑝 at 𝑤𝑖 but ¬𝑝 at 𝑤𝑖−𝜖 .
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24 Coarse-grained safety principles are usually formulated in terms of belief. Since we are thinking of confidence
as a kind of degreed notion of belief, it is natural to consider versions of coarse-grained safety formulated, as is
Safety, in terms of all-or-nothing confidence. For influential defenses of safety principles concerning belief, see
Sosa (1999), Williamson (2000), and Pritchard (2005) among others.
25 Notice that Safety does not imply Confidence Safety, since at𝑤𝑗 the agentmay fall below the threshold necessary
for outright confidence, even though her confidence levels at 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑗 are similar. But Confidence Safety
implies Safety given the plausible assumption that if S knows 𝑝 at𝑤𝑖 , and the agent is confident in 𝑝 at𝑤𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖 ,
then there is some world𝑤𝑘 where𝐾𝑝 is true at𝑤𝑘 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑘 , and 𝐶𝑘(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶𝑗(𝑝).𝑤𝑘 might well be𝑤𝑖 ; but even if
the agent’s confidence at𝑤𝑖 is too different from her confidence at𝑤𝑗 , there will plausibly be some intermediate
world 𝑘 between 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑘 where 𝐾𝑝 is still true, and yet the agent’s confidence is similar to her confidence at
𝑤𝑗 .
26 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us to clarify this point.
27 Although such a claim would be relatively natural on the pragmatic account of reliance discussed in the paper,
we prefer not to take a firm stand here, since we suspect that the surrounding dialectic would be similar to that
arising for Stalnaker’s account of belief and would therefore take us far afield.
28 Some recent work of possible relevance to this strategy is Goldstein (2016), which investigates the norms on
rational intention by exploring the conditions under which the dispositions characteristic of intending are prag-
matically appropriate.
29 The case is originally from Ross and Schroeder (2014). The presention below is from Gao (2018). See Cohen
(1999), DeRose (1992), Gerken (2017), and Stanley (2005) for similar cases.
30 This treatment of degrees of confidence is structurally analogous to Gao (2018)’s analysis of pragmatic encroach-
ment in terms of shifting levels of credence.
31 Versions of this paper were presented at Lingnan University, the National University of Singapore, NYU Shang-
hai, University College London, and Yonsei University. We are grateful to the audiences for their feedback. For
helpful suggestions, comments, and discussion, we would like to thank an anonymous referee for this journal,
Derek Baker, Bob Beddor, Sam Carter, Dan Greco, Sebastian Liu, Jenny Nado, Lavinia Picollo, Lorenzo Rossi,
Miriam Schoenfield, and Jiji Zhang.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS OF OBSERVATIONS
Here we demonstrate observations not proven in the main text.
Observation 2. Suppose Cutoff and Symmetry. Then Objectivism implies that:
𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1 if 𝑐 < 𝑖 − 𝑑
𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
if 𝑖 − 𝑑 < 𝑐 < 𝑖 + 𝑑
0 if 𝑐 > 𝑖 + 𝑑
Proof.
𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) = 𝐶ℎ(𝑝 ∣ 𝑁𝑖) (Objectivism)
=
𝐶ℎ(𝑝 ∧ 𝑁𝑖)
𝐶ℎ(𝑁𝑖)
=
𝐶ℎ({𝑤𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 > 𝑐 ∧ [𝑖 − 𝑑 < 𝑗 < 𝑖 + 𝑑]})
2𝑑
(Cutoff, Symmetry)
To evaluate this final term, there are three possible cases.
∙ 𝑐 < 𝑖 − 𝑑. Then no nearby worlds are above the cutoff 𝑐, and thus 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) is 1.
∙ 𝑐 > 𝑖 + 𝑑. Then no nearby worlds are above the cutoff 𝑐, and thus 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) is 0.
∙ 𝑖 − 𝑑 < 𝑐 < 𝑖 + 𝑑. Then 𝐶ℎ({𝑤𝑗 ∣ 𝑗 > 𝑐 ∧ [𝑖 − 𝑑 < 𝑗 < 𝑖 + 𝑑]}) = 𝐶ℎ({𝑤𝑗 ∣ 𝑐 < 𝑗 < 𝑖 + 𝑑}), so
that the proportion of the nearby worlds where 𝑝 holds is 𝑖 + 𝑑 − 𝑐. Thus 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) is 𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
.
□
Observation 3. Suppose Cutoff and Symmetry. Then Objectivism implies that 𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 iff
𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) >
1
2
.
Proof. By Symmetry and Cutoff, 𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 iff 𝐶ℎ(𝑝 ∣ 𝑁𝑖) >
1
2
. So by Objectivism, this holds
iff 𝐶!(𝑝) > 1
2
. □
Observation 4.
4.1 Suppose Cutoff and Symmetry. Then Objectivism and Lockeanism imply Factivity.
4.2 Factivity, KC, and Ideal Reliability imply Collapse.
Proof. Part 1: By Lockeanism,𝐶!𝑝 iff𝐶!(𝑝) > 𝑙 > 1
2
. By the previous observation,𝐶!(𝑝) > 1
2
implies
𝑝.
Part 2: Suppose 𝐶!𝑝. By Factivity, 𝑝. By Ideal Reliability, 𝐾!𝑝. By KC, 𝐾!𝑝 implies 𝐶!𝑝. □
Observation 5. Suppose Cutoff, Cutoff Identification, and Symmetry. Then Objectivism, Lock-
eanism, KC, and Ideal Reliability imply 𝐾!𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 iff 𝑖 > 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑.
Proof. There are three cases to consider.
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Case (a): 𝑖 − 𝑑 < 𝑐 < 𝑖 + 𝑑, so that 𝐶!𝑝 = 𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
.
Suppose that 𝐾!𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 . By KC, we know that 𝐶!𝑝, and so by Symmetry, Cutoff,
Cutoff Identification, and Objectivism, 𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
> 𝑐.
Conversely, suppose 𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
> 𝑐. By Cutoff, Symmetry, Cutoff Identification, Lock-
eanism, and Objectivism, we know that 𝐶!𝑝. From Collapse, we can infer 𝐾!𝑝. More-
over, our previous observation showed that Collapse is implied by our other assump-
tions. This simplifies to: 𝐾!𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 iff 𝑖 > 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑.
Case (b): 𝑐 < 𝑖 − 𝑑. Then 𝐾! is true at 𝑤𝑖 , since 𝐶!(𝑝) = 1. Since 𝑐 < 𝑖 − 𝑑, we can infer 𝑖 > 𝑐 + 𝑑.
So the following inequality holds, where we substitute (𝑐 + 𝑑) for 𝑖:
𝑖 + 𝑑 − 𝑐
2𝑑
>
(𝑐 + 𝑑) + 𝑑 − 𝑐
2𝑑
=
2𝑑
2𝑑
= 1 > 𝑐.
Thus 𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
> 𝑐.
Case (c): 𝑖 + 𝑑 < 𝑐. Then 𝐾! fails at 𝑤𝑖 since 𝐶!(𝑝) = 0. For this reason, the following inequality
holds, where we substitute 𝑐 for (𝑖 + 𝑑):
𝑖 + 𝑑 − 𝑐
2𝑑
<
𝑐 − 𝑐
2𝑑
=
0
2𝑑
= 0 < 𝑐.
Thus 𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
< 𝑐.
□
Observation 6. Suppose Cutoff, Cutoff Identification, and Symmetry. Then Objectivism, Lock-
eanism, KC, and Ideal Reliability imply that:
1. Ideal Luminosity fails at 𝑤𝑖 iff 𝑐 < 𝑖 < 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑.
2. Ideal Luminosity fails at some 𝑤𝑖 iff 𝑐 > 0.5.
Proof. For part 1, we know from Observation 6 that 𝐾!𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 iff 𝑖 > 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑. We also
know that 𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 iff 𝑖 > 𝑐. Together, these facts imply that Ideal Luminosity fails at 𝑤𝑖 iff
𝑐 < 𝑖 and 𝑖 < 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑.
For part 2, there exists some𝑤𝑖 where Ideal Luminosity fails iff for some 𝑖, 𝑐 < 𝑖 < 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑.
But this holds iff 𝑐 < 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑 iff 𝑑 < 2𝑑𝑐 iff 1 < 2𝑐 iff 1
2
< 𝑐. □
Observation 7. Suppose Cutoff, Cutoff Identification, Distance Identification, and Symmetry.
Then Objectivism, Lockeanism, KC, and Ideal Reliability imply that:
1. Ideal Confidence Safety fails at𝑤𝑖 and𝑤𝑗 iff (a) 𝑖 > 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑, (b) |𝑖 − 𝑗| < 2𝑑2, (c) 𝑗 ≤ 𝑐, and
(d) 𝑐 − 𝑑 < 𝑖 < 𝑐 + 𝑑 and 𝑐 − 𝑑 < 𝑗 < 𝑐 + 𝑑.
2. Ideal Confidence Safety fails at some 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑤𝑗 iff 𝑐 − 𝑑 <
1
2
.
Proof. For part 1, notice that there are three possibilities for each of 𝑖 and 𝑗:
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(i) 𝑖 (respectively, 𝑗) is in the interval (𝑐 − 𝑑, 𝑐 + 𝑑), in which case 𝐶𝑖(𝑝) is
𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
.
(ii) 𝑖 (respectively, 𝑗) is above the interval, i.e. 𝑐 + 𝑑 < 𝑖, in which case 𝐶𝑖(𝑝) = 1.
(iii) 𝑖 (respectively, 𝑗) is below the interval, i.e. 𝑖 < 𝑐 − 𝑑, in which case 𝐶𝑖(𝑝) = 0.
There are thus five cases to consider, without loss of generality. For each case we first calculate
the conditions under which𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝), and then investigate the conditions under which Con-
fidence Safety fails. Condition 9d) holds only in Case (1); in all other cases, we’ll show that Ideal
Confidence Safety holds.
Case (1). Both 𝑖 and 𝑗 are in the interval. Then 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝) iff | 𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
−
𝑗+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
| < 𝑑 iff | 𝑖−𝑗
2𝑑
| < 𝑑
iff |𝑖 − 𝑗| < 2𝑑2.
Conditions (a) and (c) are trivially satisfied. For condition (b), notice that this holds
iff 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑 − 𝑐 < 2𝑑2, which holds iff 2𝑑𝑐 − 𝑑 < 2𝑑2 iff 2𝑐 − 1 < 2𝑑 iff 𝑐 − 1
2
< 𝑑 iff
𝑐 − 𝑑 <
1
2
.
Case (2). 𝑖 is above the interval and 𝑗 is below. Then 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) is not similar to 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝), since 0 is not
similar to 1.
No violations of Ideal Confidence Safety arise, since 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) ≉ 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝).
Case (3). 𝑖 is in the interval, 𝑗 is above. Then 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) =
𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
and 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝) = 1. So 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝)
iff |𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) − 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝)| < 𝑑 iff |1 − 𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
| < 𝑑 iff 1 − 𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
< 𝑑 iff 2𝑑 − (𝑖 + 𝑑 − 𝑐) < 2𝑑2 iff
𝑑 + 𝑐 − 𝑖 < 2𝑑2.
No violations of Confidence Safety arise. For 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝) = 1, so 𝐾!
𝑗
holds. Thus a violation
occurs iff (i) 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝) and (ii) 𝑝 is false at 𝑤𝑖 , i.e. 𝑖 < 𝑐. But if a violation occurs,
𝑖 < 𝑐, so 𝑐 − 𝑖 > 0, and so 𝑑 < 𝑑 + 𝑐 − 𝑖 < 2𝑑2. But then 1 < 2𝑑 i.e. 1∕2 < 𝑑. But 𝑑 >
1∕2 is ruled out by Symmetry, since it has the trivializing consequence that the agent’s
confidence level in 𝑝 is 1∕2 at every 𝑤𝑖 .
Case (4). 𝑖 is in the interval, 𝑗 is below. Then 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) =
𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
and 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝) = 0. So 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝) iff
𝑖+𝑑−𝑐
2𝑑
< 𝑑 iff 𝑖 + 𝑑 − 𝑐 < 2𝑑2.
No violations of Confidence Safety arise. For 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝) = 0, so 𝑝 is false at𝑤𝑗 . Thus a viola-
tion occurs iff (i) 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝) and (b) 𝐾!
𝑖
holds. But suppose a violation occurs. From
part 1, (i) holds iff 𝑖 + 𝑑 − 𝑐 < 2𝑑2 iff 𝑖 < 2𝑑2 + 𝑐 − 𝑑.
Thus a violation occurs iff (i) and (ii) both hold iff 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑 < 𝑖 < 2𝑑2 + 𝑐 − 𝑑 iff
2𝑑𝑐 < 𝑖 + 𝑑 − 𝑐 < 2𝑑2 iff 𝑐 < (𝑖 + 𝑑 − 𝑐)∕2𝑑 < 𝑑. This again implies that 𝑑 > 1
2
.
Case (5). Both 𝑖 and 𝑗 are above (or below) the interval. Then 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) and 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝) are both either 0
or 1 and thus 𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝).
No violations of Confidence Safety arise, since 𝑝 is true (or false) at both 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑗 .
For part 2, note first that whenever Ideal Confidence Safety fails at𝑤𝑖 and𝑤𝑗 , Ideal Confidence
Safety also fails at 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑘, where 𝑗 < 𝑘 < 𝑐. Letting 𝜖 > 0, we can thus limit attention to the
case of 𝑗 = 𝑐 − 𝜖. Similarly, whenever Ideal Confidence Safety fails at𝑤𝑖 and𝑤𝑗 , Ideal Confidence
Safety also fails at𝑤𝑘 and𝑤𝑗, where 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑 < 𝑘 < 𝑖. We can can limit attention to the case of
𝑖 = 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑 + 𝜖. In the limit case, then, conditions (a) and (c) become trivial, and condition (b)
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collapses to the constraint that 2𝑑𝑐 + 𝑐 − 𝑑 − 𝑐 < 2𝑑2, which holds iff 2𝑑𝑐 − 𝑑 < 2𝑑2 iff 2𝑐 − 1 <
2𝑑 iff 𝑐 − 1
2
< 𝑑 iff 𝑐 − 𝑑 < 1
2
. □
We now consider relaxing the assumptions of Indifference, Cutoff Identification, and Dis-
tance Identification.
Suppose as before Dispositionalism (𝐶!(𝑝) = 𝑛 iff 𝐶ℎ𝑖(𝑅!𝑝 ∣ 𝑁𝑖) = 𝑛, Cutoff (𝑝 is true at 𝑤𝑖 iff
𝑖 > 𝑐 >
1
2
), Lockeanism (𝐶!𝑝 is true at𝑤𝑖 iff𝐶!(𝑝) > 𝑙 is true at𝑤𝑖), Centering (𝑁𝑖 = {𝑤𝑗 ∣ |𝑖 − 𝑗| <
𝑑}), and Similarity (𝐶!
𝑖
(𝑝) ≈ 𝐶!
𝑗
(𝑝) iff |𝐶𝑖(𝑝) − 𝐶𝑗(𝑝)| < 𝑠 ).
Observation 9.
1. Luminosity holds iff: whenever 𝑖 > 𝑐, 𝐶ℎ𝑖({𝑤𝑗∣𝑗>𝑐∧|𝑖−𝑗|<𝑑})
𝐶ℎ𝑖({𝑤𝑗∣|𝑖−𝑗|<𝑑}) > 𝑙.
2. Confidence Safety holds iff: if (i) 𝐶ℎ𝑖({𝑤𝑗∣𝑗>𝑐∧|𝑖−𝑗|<𝑑})
𝐶ℎ𝑖({𝑤𝑗∣|𝑖−𝑗|<𝑑}) > 𝑙, (ii) 𝑖 > 𝑐, and (iii)|𝐶ℎ𝑖({𝑤𝑗∣𝑗>𝑐∧|𝑖−𝑗|<𝑑})
𝐶ℎ𝑖({𝑤𝑗∣|𝑖−𝑗|<𝑑}) − 𝐶ℎ𝑗({𝑤𝑘∣𝑘>𝑐∧|𝑗−𝑘|<𝑑})𝐶ℎ𝑗({𝑤𝑘∣|𝑗−𝑘|<𝑑}) | < 𝑠, then (iv) 𝑗 > 𝑐.
3. Safety holds iff: if (i) 𝐶ℎ𝑖({𝑤𝑗∣𝑗>𝑐∧|𝑖−𝑗|<𝑑})
𝐶ℎ𝑖({𝑤𝑗∣|𝑖−𝑗|<𝑑}) > 𝑙, (ii) 𝑖 > 𝑐, (iii) 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖 , and (iv)
𝐶ℎ𝑗({𝑤𝑘∣𝑘>𝑐∧|𝑗−𝑘|<𝑑})
𝐶ℎ𝑗({𝑤𝑘∣|𝑗−𝑘|<𝑑}) > 𝑙, then (v) 𝑗 > 𝑐.
